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RIGHT OF PRIVACY-FORNICATION STATUTE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-STATE V. SAUNDERS
INTRODUCrION
In the early morning hours of July 23, 1973, Charles Saunders and
Bernard Busby picked up two women in Newark, New Jersey, and
drove to a deserted parking lot where the four engaged in sexual activi-
ties. The women later complained to the police, and Saunders and
Busby were arrested and indicted for rape, assault with intent to com-
mit rape, and armed robbery. The women alleged that a third man
also participated in the incident. At trial, they testified that the de-
fendants forcibly seized them on the street, drove them to a deserted
lot, and under the threat of a gun, physically compelled them to en-
gage in sexual intercourse with each of the three men. Busby and
Saunders admitted to the acts of sexual intercourse, but insisted that
they had merely promised to give the women marijuana cigarettes in
exchange for the sexual favors, and had neither coerced nor induced
them in any other way. On its own initiative, the court charged the
defendants with fornication as a lesser included offense.,
The jury returned a verdict acquitting the defendants on the
counts charged in the indictment, but found them guilty of fornica-
tion. Saunders objected to the verdict, contending that the fornica-
tion statute was unconstitutional under recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.2 The Essex County Court, Law Division, re-
fused to overturn the verdict,3 relying largely on two 1971 cases,
State v. Clark4 and State v. Lutz,5 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court had upheld the constitutionality of the fornication statute.6 The
1. The relevant New Jersey statute provides that "[a]ny person who commits
fornication is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more
than $50, or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:110-1 (West 1969). The trial court, in its charge to the jury, defined the crime
of fornication as "an act of illicit sexual intercourse by a man, married or single, with
and unmarried woman." State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 205, 381 A.2d 333, 335 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972). Saunders contended that the expansion of the right of privacy from
the married individual to the unmarried individual indicated that prior New Jersey cases
which held the fornication statute constitutional should be re-examined. 75 N.J. at
206-07, 381 A.2d at 336.
3. State v. Saunders, 130 N.J. Super. 234, 326 A.2d 84 (Essex County Ct. Law
Div. 1974).
4. 58 N.J. 72, 275 A.2d 137 (1971).
5. 57 N.J. 314, 272 A.2d 753 (1971).
6. The defendants argued that the fornication statute violated the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
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Appellate Division summarily affirmed,7 but the New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed. Held: New Jersey's fornication statute impermissibly
infringes upon the right of privacy guaranteed by both the state and
federal constitutions. State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333
(1977).
I. STANDING
At the outset, the supreme court readily disposed of the State's
assertion that the defendant lacked standing to raise his constitutional
defenses. The State argued that because the conduct under review
involved "several other persons and occurred in a public place," no
right of privacy accrued.8 In response, the court distinguished the de-
fendant's argument from one ordinarily employed in an "overbreadth
attack." It noted that the defendant had not alleged that the "statute
may be 'invalid in its application in special circumstances or fringe
areas,'' but had challenged the "normal application of the statute,"
contending that the State had "no power to prohibit" the outlawed
conduct. 10
Despite the court's ruling, it is possible to argue that the defen-
dant's attack was hinged, in substantial part, upon the claim that the
statute drew no distinction between acts committed in public and acts
committed in private. The defendant did not maintain that he had a
right to fornicate on a street comer in downtown Newark, but rather
that the Constitution protected his fundamental personal choice to
engage in the forbidden sexual activities. Any such protection, how-
Constitution, as well as their rights of privacy under the fourth and ninth amendments.
State v. Saunders, 130 N.J. Super. at 240, 326 A.2d at 87. The defendants also argued
that the statute had been selectively enforced. They submitted an affidavit from Linda
Blumkin, who as an LL.M. candidate had surveyed 1177 chief prosecutors on the sub-
ject of fornication and cohabitation prosecutions in their respective jurisdictions. Her
results indicated that the enforcement pattern in New Jersey was haphazard, a result of
widely varying prosecutorial attitudes towards the offense. Id. at 238-39, 326 A.2d at
86-87.
Judge Bedford, writing for the trial court, acknowledged the limited prosecutions
under the fornication statute, but was of the opinion that Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), did not undermine the reasoning of the Clark and Lutz decisions.
7. State v. Saunders, 142 N.J. Super. 287, 361 A.2d 111 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
8. 75 N.J. at 208, 381 A.2d at 337. The state, which had not raised this issue
prior to appeal, cited United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), for the proposition
that a defendant may not challenge the constitutionality of a legislative enactment
unless that enactment is unconstitutional as applied to him.
9. 75 N.J. at 209, 381 A.2d at 337 (quoting State v. Monteleone, 36 N.J. 93, 99,
175 A.2d 225, 233 (1961) ).
10. 75 N.J. at 209, 381 A.2d at 337.
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ever, should be limited to conduct that occurs in private." The ab-
sence of this element of "privateness" should have deprived the de-
fendant of any standing to question the constitutionality of the
statute. 2 The United States Supreme Court has consistently main-
tained that "overbreadth attacks," if they are entertained at all, should
be curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws.
1
3
IL THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL PRIVACY CONCEPTS
In Saunders, the court duly noted that the right of privacy "is
not explicitly mentioned in either the New Jersey or [the] United
States Constitutions."' 4 Nonetheless, it chose to rely almost exclusively
on federal precedent to reach its decision, avoiding perhaps the easier
route of analyzing the case under the state constitution.'5 Writing for
11. Cf. Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977
(1976) (Defendants had engaged in sex in the presence of a third party. The court
posited that the element of seclusion was a necessary prerequisite for asserting one's
privacy rights, and that the third party onlooker had destroyed the "seclusion" aspect
of the sexual relations.).
12. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 233, 500 S.W.2d 368, 373 (1973)
(Defendants, who had committed an act of sodomy at a highway rest area, were denied
standing to question the sodomy statute's failure to distinguish between publicly and
privately committed acts.); Commonwealth v. LaBella, 364 Mass. 550, 553-54, 306
N.E.2d 813, 815-16 (1974) (Defendant, convicted of committing an "unnatural and
lascivious act" in the front seat of his automobile, was not allowed to invoke a "right of
privacy in the home" defense.).
13. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-15 (1973).
14. 75 N.J. at 210, 381 A.2d at 337.
15. New Jersey courts have not encountered the difficulties the federal courts have
wrestled with in isolating the origins of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Note, On Pri-
vacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 4a N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670, 671
(1973). In McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945), aff'd,
137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842 (1946), a case decided just prior to the adoption of the
present New Jersey Constitution, the court recognized the right of privacy and pin-
pointed its situs in the state constitution. McGovern involved a sheriff who was indicted
for failure to fingerprint and photograph certain persons following their indictment. The
sheriff desired an injunction to restrain the superintendent of the State Police from
taking his fingerprints and photograph and forwarding copies to other criminal agencies.
The court granted the injunction o the ground that the state had no right to disseminate
the materials unless the sheriff was a fugitive from justice. The court called the right
of privacy "one of the 'natural and inalienable rights' recognized in article 1, section 1
of the constitution of this state," and stated that it had "its origin in natural law [and]
is immutable and absolute . . . ." 137 N.J. Eq. at 33, 43 A.2d at 519. Subsequent
decisions in New Jersey reaffirmed the existence and importance of a right of privacy
in the present state constitution. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that the father of a young woman in a
comatose condition described as "chronic persistent vegetative state" possessed the right
to discontinue all life support apparatus in the face of certain imminent death for his
daughter if the life support systems were removed).
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the majority, Justice Pashman cited Griswold v. Connecticut0 as the
first instance of federal recognition of a right of privacy, and then
noted that several later Supreme Court decisions, including Roe v.
Wade17 and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 8 firmly established the
constitutional stature of this right. He conceded that the "precise
scope" of the right's protected interests never had been definitively
sketched, but felt that the right should not be confined to the "private
situations" isolated in previous cases.19
To support the court's perception of broadening privacy rights,
Justice Pashman relied heavily on Carey, wherein the United States
Supreme Court reviewed a New York statute that criminalized sales or
distributions of contraceptive devices to minors under the age of six-
teen years by persons other than physicians.20 Justice Pashman in-
ferred that the actual "constitutional basis for the protection of such
decisions is their relationship to individual autonomy,".2 1 despite the
Carey Court's explicit statement that "[t]he decision whether or not to
beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitu-
tionally protected choices." 22 He concluded, therefore, that the ulti-
mate interest protected by the right of privacy was the "freedom of
personal development.
'2 3
This conclusion appears to have been prompted by Justice
Brennan's statement in Carey that an individual's decision concerning
contraception was "among the most private and sensitive" privileges
protected by the right of privacy.24 The Saunders court was mistaken,
however, in inferring from Brennan's assertion that the right of pri-
vacy provided protection beyond the field of decisions involving
whether or not to beget a child. Justice Brennan subsequently quali-
fied his assertion, confirming that he intended to restrict its holding:
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold has been construed as marking the establish-
ment of a zone of privacy emanating, as former Justice Douglas suggested, from the
penumbras of several constitutional guarantees. 381 U.S. at 484.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
19. 75 N.J. at 211, 381 A.2d at 338 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing and education) ).
20. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1971).
21. 75 N.J. at 212, 381 A.2d at 339.
22. 431 U.S. at 685.
23. 75 N.J. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339. The court equated the freedom of per-
sonal development with a "right to intimacy" and "personal autonomy." 75 N.J. at 212,
381 A.2d at 339.
24. 431 U.S. at 685.
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"'If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.' " Thus, constitutional
protection for contraception decisions would appear to be derived
from constitutional protection for decisions about bearing children.
An argument can be made, though, that the Supreme Court did
intimate in Carey that the right of privacy protects a broader range
of decisions. The Court initially noted that the "'right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy' " recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade "includes 'the interest in independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions,' "26 and listed several "personal
decisions" that had already been accorded protection from "unjusti-
fied governmental interference."27 Indicating that the list was not de-
finitive, the Court pointed out that the "outer limits" of the "certain
kinds of important decisions" had not been delineated,28 and that it
had not conclusively responded to the "question whether and to what
extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults."'2
9
It is nonetheless apparent that the Supreme Court has accepted
Justice Rehnquist's assertion in Carey that Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney did, in fact, definitively establish the "facial" constitutional
validity of criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts.30
25. Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453) (emphasis added).
26. 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152, and Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) ).
27. 431 U.S. at 685. See note 19 supra.
28. Id. at 684.
29. Id. at 688 n.5; see id. at 694 n.17. Viewed in this light, Carey's significance
goes beyond the affirmation of potential expansion of the right of privacy. It extends
the holding of Griswold. In Carey, the state argued that neither Griswold nor Eisenstadt
"should be treated as reflecting upon the State's power to limit or prohibit distribution
of contraceptives to any persons." 431 U.S. at 687. The two prior cases, it continued,
had dealt solely with the use of and equal access to contraceptives. The state's argu-
ment was a direct attempt to categorize and thereby limit the right of privacy to the
fact situations of the prior cases. The Court vigorously objected to this categorization,
and noted the "fatal fallacy" in the argument: "the underlying premise of [the prior]
decisions," it emphasized, was "that the Constitution protects the right of the indi-
vidual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into . .. the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." 431 U.S. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. at 453 (emphasis added) ). In this regard Carey declared that the restrictions on
the distribution of contraceptives "clearly burden[ed] the freedom to make such deci-
sions." 431 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
30. See 431 U.S. at 718 n.2. The Court's decision in Commonwealth's Attorney to
deny the "mature individual's choice of a sexual partner" relied heavily on a narrow in-
terpretation of Griswold and its progeny, reading the cases as merely denying the state
the right to trespass "upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the sanctity
1978]
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On May 15, 1978, the Court again refused to consider a challenge to
a state's criminalization of consensual sodomy,3' lending credence to
the belief that the present members of the Court will not entertain
suggestions to expand the "personal decisions" beyond those areas
previously delineated. Consequently, the Saunders court may have
misread the signals emitted by Carey.
III. NEw JERSEY'S EXTENTION OF PROTECTION TO
CONSENSUAL HETEROSEXUAL CONDUCT
In State v. Lut, 2 2 decided in 1971, the New Jersey Supreme
Court affirmed a fornication conviction despite the defendant's argu-
ment that the statute unconstitutionally invaded the federally-pro-
tected zone of privacy. The court rejected the argument virtually
without analysis, by referring the defendant to the concurring opin-
ions of Justices Goldberg and White in Griswold,2 and to the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman,34 all of
which emphasized that the right protected was the marital right of
privacy.
Shortly thereafter, in State v. Clark,2 5 the court affirmed its hold-
ing in Lutz. In Clark, the Welfare Department had refused to give
the defendant financial assistance for the support of her illegitimate
child until she filed a bastardy complaint against the putative father.
During the bastardy proceedings, the judge directed that charges be
filed against both parents for violation of the fornication statute. The
resulting conviction was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which stated that fifth amendment implications and public policy
considerations precluded the conviction. 36 Although it did not need
of the home, or upon the nurture of family life." Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Extensive support
for the proposition was drawn from the statements of Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and
Harlan in Griswold pertaining to the sanctity of marriage, home and family. Additional
support arose from dicta that hinted that homosexual intimacy was "denunciable" by
the state. See 403 F. Supp. 1201-02. However, there has been state court resistence to
Justice Rehnquist's statement. In a recent New York case, In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62,
400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1977), the court declared that it did not find Commonwealth's
Attorney dispositive of the issues in private consensual sodomy cases, and indicated that
the summary affirmance only possessed "minimal precedential value." Id. at 76 n.21,
400 N.Y.S.2d at 465 n.21.
31. Enslin v. Bean, 46 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. May 15, 1978).
32. 57 N.J. 314, 272 A.2d 753 (1971).
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 498-99, 505-07.
34. 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961).
35. 58 N.J. 72, 275 A.2d 137 (1971).
36. Id. at 83, 275 A.2d at 143.
[Vol. 27
STATE V. SAUNDERS
to reach the issue, the court rejected without explanation the defen-
dant's claim that the statute "unjustifiably interferred" with their
right of privacy, deeming it sufficient to refer the defendants to the
analysis offered in Lutz.37
Carey's elaboration of Griswold, as interpreted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, thus allowed the court to retreat gracefully
from the stance it had articulated in Lutz and Clark. The Saunders
court concluded that determinations in matters of conception were
only one of several fundamentally personal and private decisions
shielded under the right of privacy., The court may have been
swayed by the argument presented by the defendant in his appellate
brief: that a delineation of other equally sensitive and private deci-
sions in the right of privacy's "cluster of constitutionally protected
choices" should not be precluded by the fortuitous fact that the right
of privacy first emerged in an opinion concerned with prohibitions of
contraceptives.
39
Once the Saunders court decided that the fornication statute "im-
pinge[d] upon the fundamental right of privacy," it proceeded to ne-
gate the proffered compelling state interests in regulating acts of for-
nication.40 The court did not deny that the State had a compelling
37. Id. at 82-83, 275 A.2d at 143.
38. See 75 N.J. at 211-12, 381 A.2d at 338-39. The decision may alternately be
viewed as a return to the common law standard, which did not criminalize fornication
when committed in private. 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 676, at
476 (Anderson ed. 1957).
39. See also Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 64, State v. Saunders, 130 N.J.
Super. 234, 326 A.2d 84 (Essex County Ct. Law Div. 1974):
The right of privacy recognized in Griswold does not rest on any specific
provision of the Constitution which in explicit terms could limit its growth be-
yond the marriage relationship. It is supported by such recognized constitu-
tional rights as the freedom of association, the freedom from self-incrimina-
tion, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the freedom
from having soldiers quartered in private houses. None of these protections
are limited in scope to the persons and homes of married couples; thus no
basis exists in the words of the Constitution itself for limiting to married
couples the constitutional right of privacy first enunciated in Griswold. The
Court in its opinion applied the right only in that limited context, true, but
such limitation was unlikely to withstand the test of time and logic.
40. 75 N.J. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341. Note that prior United States Supreme Court
decisions have held that "even a burdensome regulation may be validated by a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest." Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 686.
Such interests as "safeguarding health, . . . maintaining medical standards, and . . .
protecting potential life" have been cited as examples of interests which may, at some
point, "become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation [of a fundamental interest]."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
state interest must be of a compelling nature to justify the regulation of the funda-
mental right. "Regulations imposing a burden on [the fundamental right] may be
justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only
those interests." 431 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added).
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interest in preventing venereal disease, but it questioned whether the
statute had been designed with that end in mind. The court observed
that the prohibition against fornication had little deterrent value,
and that a vigorous prosecution of the statute would, most likely, ad-
versely affect the State's program to combat the disease.41 Nor was the
court convinced that the prevention of the propagation of illegitimate
children was measurably advanced by the statute, especially in light
of prior studies demonstrating the unsuccessful deterrent effect
achieved by the restraints on contraceptives. 42 Finally, the court dis-
missed out of hand the State's contention that the prevention of illicit
sex preserved the marriage relationship and the public morals. As the
court tersely noted, public morality could be furthered only to the
extent that the regulation affected public morality.
43
Justice Schreiber, in his concurrence, departed from the majority's
holding only to disapprove of the court's reliance upon recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.4 He did not agree that Carey sig-
nalled a departure from the view that the state could prohibit certain
consensual acts, and further asserted that the summary affirmance in
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney was "totally incompatible" with the
majority's suggestion that a broad individual autonomy was encom-
passed within the federal right of privacy. 45
Justice Schreiber suspected, however, that the statute was an at-
tempt to regulate private morality, and as such was prohibited by
article I, section 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. 40 The state con-
stitution, he pointed out, differs from the federal in that it limits the
sovereign powers of the state, which had been vested in the legislature.
The "natural and unalienable rights" it grants allow for the exercise
of private consensual conduct incident to the right of privacy's "free-
dom to think, decide and act."'47 Of course, this freedom is conditioned
upon not interfering with the rights of others.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Clifford did not address the issue of
the defendant's lack of standing.48 He did mention in passing that
the case did not appear to be a "proper vehicle" for confronting the
41. 75 N.J. at 217-18, 381 A.2d at 341-42.
42. Id. at 218-19, 381 A.2d at 342. For a list of the studies upon which the court
relied, see Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 695 n.19.
43. 75 N.J. at 219, 381 A.2d at 342.
44. Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 343 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 224, 381 A.2d at 344 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
46. N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 1.
47. 75 N.J. at 225, 381 A.2d at 345.
48. Id. at 228, 381 A.2d at 346 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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constitutional issues, presumably because of the improper situs of the
conduct. Nonetheless, he admitted that if the case had been a proper
one for the resolution of the constitutional issue, he would have fol-
lowed the concurring justice's ruling. Finally, he strongly argued that
the court should have resolved the propriety of including fornication
as a lesser included offense to the crime of rape by requesting that
parties submit further briefs on the matter.4
9
IV. IMPACT ON FORNICATION PROSECUTIONS IN NEw JERSEY
The paucity of fornication presecutions throughout the United
States, 0 as well as in New Jersey,51 tends to show that the Saunders
decision will not substantially alter the state policy towards such
prosecutions. In the seventy years since State v. Sharp,52 New Jersey
had addressed the issue in its appellate courts on only three occasions. 53
The state's policy towards enforcement has been termed "limited," and
New Jersey's State Division of Criminal Justice has announced that
its office "has no experience in fornication." 54 Whether the rationales
for nonenforcement can be attributed to the inherent difficulties in
gathering evidence of the furtively performed acts,55 or to a dramatic
shift in the public attitude toward toleration of such activities, 56 it
is evident that the state has no policy for the regular enforcement of
this statute. By its failure to administer the law, New Jersey has in
effect adopted the reforms suggested by the Advisory Committee to
the Model Penal Code,57 and by its own Criminal Law Commission, 58
both of which submit that fornication should not constitute a crime.
Indeed, as the Saunders court remarked, its decision merely sanctioned
judicially the conclusions reached in those reports.
59
49. Id. at 229, 381 A.2d at 347 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
50. See generally L. Blumkin, The Law of Fornication and Cohabitation-with
Special Attention to Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion (May 1, 1973) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis in Harvard Law School Library).
51. See State v. Clark, 58 N.J. at 75-76, 275 A.2d at 139.
52. 75 N.J.L. 201, 66 A. 926 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd, 76 N.J.L. 576, 70 A. 110
(E. & A. 1908).
53. See State v. Clark, 58 N.J. 72, 275 A.2d 137 (1971); State v. Lutz, 57 N.J.
314, 272 A.2d 753 (1971); State v. Ruttberg, 87 N.J.L. 5, 93 A. 97 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
54. State v. Saunders, 130 N.J. Super. at 240, 326 A.2d at 87.
55. See, e.g., id. at 241, 326 A.2d at 87-88.
56. Id. at 238, 326 A.2d at 86.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
58. Commentary, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commis-
sion, 2 N.J. PENAL CODE ch. 14, at 189 (1971).
59. 75 N.J. at 219 n.8, 381 A.2d at 342 n.8.
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Objections have been voiced concerning the propriety of such
judicial law-making.60 It is argued that it is for the legislature to
amend or dispose of such unjust laws.61 As has been aptly stated,
"'[g]overnment by, for and of the people' cannot easily be deemed
intrusive when making regulations ... for the welfare of the people."0 2
But while "the principles of permissible accommodation between
private right and public good, . . . based in hallowed scripture, have
continued to change,"6' 3 those "hallowed scriptures" have remained en-
trenched in the statute books of most states. Repeal of these statutes
has been extremely difficult; the act of repeal has been perceived as
a sanctioning of that which was formerly outlawed, rather than as a
recognition of individual rights.6 Political practicality has often dic-
tated legislative inaction.
Yet, it would be "'ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a
mainspring of representative government is impaired.' "65 The judici-
ary cannot evade its responsibility and yield to the legislature when
individual liberties are at stake. Rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights are not to be made dependent on the outcome of elections.60
V. OTHER "PRIvATE ECISIONS": SOME CONSIDERATIONS
Saunders is a significant interpretation of New Jersey and federal
privacy rights and one with potentially wide-spread ramifications. The
court incorporated into its holding the broad claim that "sexual ac-
tivities between adults are protected by the right of privacy."07 Such
60. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1202 ("If a
State determines that punishment . . . is appropriate in the promotion of morality and
decency, it is not for the courts to say that the State is not free to do so."); State v.
Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 111, 547 P.2d 6, 10 (1976) ("We are ... cognizant of our role
as the judicial branch of government and not the legislative."); State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348, 367 (Iowa 1976) (Reynoldson, J., dissenting) (The majority overstepped
its bounds "unnecessarily [interferring] in complex moral and social areas better left to
the legislature."). See also Comment, Right of Privacy Protects Consensual Hetero-
sexual Behavior, State v. Pilcher, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 337, 347.
61. Cornblatt, Sin and the Laws of New Jersey, 14 N.J. ST. B.J. 20, 24 (Fall
1970) (quoting Sills, League of New Jersey Municipalities Magazine 26-27 (April
1969) ).
62. I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
63. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1410 (1974).
64. See Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 85-89, State v. Saunders, 130 N.J.
Super. 234, 326 A.2d 84 (Essex County Ct. Law Div. 1974).
65. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 249 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 236 (D. Haw. 1956).
66. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268-69 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
67. 75 N.J. at 214, 381 A.2d at 340.
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language suggests that the court may soon be willing to extend pro-
tection to other private activity, such as all private consensual sexual
conduct-whether homosexual or heterosexual-so long as no one is
harmed, as well as private possession and consumption of marijuana
within the home.
A. Homosexuality
The current view of the New Jersey Supreme Court on the con-
stitutionality of statutes that proscribe acts of sodomy was articulated
in State v. Lair," where the court reviewed a rape and sodomy con-
viction. The court agreed that a constitutional right of marital privacy
protected even deviate sexual acts when practiced consensually and
in private by a married couple, but declined to extend this protection
to consensual conduct practiced by unmarried couples. The court em-
phasized that Griswold had stressed a marital privacy right.
Chief Justice Weintraub, concurring in Lair, expressed grave
reservations as to the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting pri-
vate consensual sexual acts. In an earlier opinion, he had noted that
criminal prohibtions against contraceptives and abortions similarly
depended upon a "spiritual supposition" of evil.69 The blanket appli-
cation of criminal sanctions on sodomy, and the nonavailability of
consent as a defense, led him to conclude that society's refusal to pro-
vide legal outlets for homosexuals to pursue the "dictates of their
nature" was questionable. He doubted "the existence of a public in-
terest sufficient to justify an edict that the homosexual shall behave
as a heterosexual or not at all." 70
The inference is easily drawn from Saunders that the New Jersey
Supreme Court has yielded to the cogent arguments of Chief Justice
Weintraub, and may no longer consider Lair good law. In Saunders,
it specifically distinguished Lair by observing that Lair's factual situa-
tion should have precluded discussion of the constitutionality of the
sodomy statute.7 1 Moreover, it cited an Iowa sodomy case, State v.
Pilcher,72 as support for its position that a fornication statute uncon-
stitutionally intrudes upon an individual's privacy rights.
68. 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
69. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 59, 227 A.2d 689, 709 (1967).
70. 62 N.J. at 398, 301 A.2d at 754 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
71. 75 N.J. at 217 n.7, 381 A.2d at 341 n.7. The court noted that it had not
been faced with any factual basis for finding that consent had been given for the
sexual acts performed there.
72. 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
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In Pilcher, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted Eisenstadt as
extending protection to private consensual conduct of unmarried
adults, and declared the sodomy statute unconstitutionally overbroad.
In an attempt to limit the impact of its holding, however, the court
expressly refrained from deciding whether the state, by means of a
narrowly drawn statute, could constitutionally prohibit consensual
sodomy among homosexuals.
It is nevertheless clear that by declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional on its face, the Iowa court failed to restrict its holding to the
factual situation at hand. It quoted approvingly from Lovisi v. Slay-
ton,73 a federal district court decision which denied the defendants the
right to assert their privacy claims, for the proposition that the right
of privacy protected decisions to engage in conduct that has no effect
on others and is personal to the actor; a definition certainly broad
enough to encompass homosexual rights. 4 The court also stated that
the statute was not amenable to the doctrine of separability, and em-
phatically rejected the alternative of judicially supplying an amended
legislative intent. 5 Realizing the full impact of the holding, the Iowa
legislature quickly responded by enacting a new sexual abuse statute.7
Notable in this statute is the conspicous absence of any language regu-
lating private consensual behavior among adults.
B. Marijuana
In New Jersey, private possession and consumption of marijuana
is currently proscribed by the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,77
which in 1970 replaced the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law.7 8 State v.
73. 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973).
74. 242 N.W.2d at 358.
75. Id. at 359.
76. The new act defined sexual abuse as:
Any sex act between persons is sexual abuse by either of the participants
when the act is performed with the other participant in any of the following
circumstances:
1. Such act is done by force or against the will of the other. In any case
where the consent or acquiescence of the other is procured by threats of vio-
lence toward any person, the act is done against the will of the other.
2. Such other participant is suffering from a mental defect or incapacity
which precludes giving consent, or lacks the mental capacity to know the
right and wrong of conduct in sexual matters.
3. Such other participant is a child.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1 (West Supp. 1978).
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:21-1 to 21-45 (West Supp. 1976). In particular, see
§ 24:21-20.
78. 1933 N.J. Laws. ch. 186 § 17.
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Nugent, 9 a per curium opinion affirming the conviction of two de-
fendants for possession of marijuana, has apparently retained its prece-
dential value despite its having been decided under the old law. In
that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court brushed aside the defen-
dants' contentions that the convictions intruded upon constitutionally
protected rights.
It is not disputed that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
that have considered the issue are nearly unanimous in their refusal
to accept a constitutional right to possess and consume marijuana.80
But past decisions holding that the right of privacy does not prevent
legislatures from proscribing private possession and use of marijuana
were grounded, in part, upon a reluctance to elevate the notion of
personal autonomy to the status of a fundamental right."' In Saunders,
however, the court did not hesitate to declare that "[t]he right of
personal autonomy is fundamental to a free society."
8 2
Several recent decisions have found state constitutional provisions
determinative of whether or not protection would be accorded to
private possession and use of marijuana. The Hawaiian Supreme
Court, for example, has held that the Hawaiian constitution does not
raise the privacy right to the equivalent of a first amendment right.8 3
79. 125 N.J. Super. 528, 312 A.2d 158 (1973). In Nugent, the defendants in-
sisted that Griswold and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), implied a funda-
mental right to possess marijuana free of governmental intrusions. They maintained that
prohibition of private possession was unconstitutional because it encroached upon purely
private conduct. The Court disagreed, remarking that the right to possess marijuana
hardly qualified as a fundamental right protected by Griswold, and that Stanley was
distinguishable since it involved a "clear First Amendment right." Id. at 534, 312
A.2d at 162.
80. See, e.g., People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal. App.2d 597, 65 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1968);
State v. Anonymous, 32 Conn. Supp. 324, 355 A.2d 729 (1976); Kreisher v. State,
319 A.2d 31 (Del. 1974); State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 531 P.2d 1193 (1975);
People v. Alexander, 56 Mich. App. 400, 223 N.W.2d 750 (1974).
81. See, e.g., State v. Renfro, 56 Haw. 501, 542 P.2d 366 (1976); State v.
Baker, 56 Haw. 271, 535 P.2d 1394 (1975); State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d
306 (1972); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969). Courts
have also rejected such claims on the ground that private possession and use of mari-
juana was not fundamental to the American scheme ,of justice or necessary to ordered
liberty. See Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
82. 75 N.J. at 220, 381 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 56 Haw. 271, 535 P.2d 1394 (1976). In Baker, the
Hawaiian Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that a statute proscribing the
promotion of a detrimental drug was unconstitutional, insofar as the statute related to
possession of marijuana. The court found that the statute, which prohibited commercial
distribution of harmful substances, may "sweep within its ambit" the possession of mari-
juana for personal use as an enforcement measure. In State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327,
493 P.2d 306 (1972), the court affirmed the conviction of defendant for possession of
marijuana. It did not find that the use of marijuana involved an issue of "fundamental
liberty" or that possession of marijuana fell within the "class of interests" to which
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Similarly, the inapplicability of the right to privacy provision in the
Massachusetts' constitution severely handicapped the petitioner's case
in Commonwealth v. Leis.s4 Finally, a 1975 decision in Alaska, Ravin
v. State,8s has held that no adequate justification existed for the state's
prohibition of the possession of marijuana by adults for personal con-
sumption in the home. Subsequent casess6 have explained Ravin by
observing that the decision was based substantially upon the strong
right of privacy provision in the Alaska constitution.
7
CONCLUSION
The increased tolerance for homosexuality and other deviant
sexual conduct has been attributed by one commentator to the "de-
velopment of our industrial civilization" to the stage where such
once-disruptive activity no longer effects the same passions and emo-
tionality s8 The Honorable Arthur J. Sills, a former Attorney General
of New Jersey, has stated a second, more practical reason for the less-
ened enthusiasm for continuing the designation of these acts as crimi-
nal offenses: "[They] have complicated the duties of police, prosecu-
tor and court and have hindered the attainment of a rational and
just penal system."89 Similarly, it has been argued that the penal sys-
tem would "deplete its reserve of legitimacy" if it continued to prose-
cute certain behavior. 90 Acceptance by the Saunders court of the no-
tion of personal development may reflect a change in society's attitude
the Hawaiian constitution accorded the "highest degree of protection." 53 Haw. at
332-33, 493 P.2d at 310.
The Hawaiian courts placed some emphasis on the fact that the wording of
article I, section V, of Hawaii's constitution was, prior to the privacy amendment,
identical to that of the fourth amendment in the United States Bill of Rights. See State
v. Roy, 54 Haw. 513, 517, 510 P.2d 1066, 1068-69 (1973). From the plain wording
of the amendment, the courts concluded that the right of privacy is protected only against
unreasonable invasions. See State v. Baker, 56 Haw. at 280, 535 P.2d at 1399.
84. Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 195, 243 N.E.2d 898, 903-04 (1969).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a statute proscribing the pos-
session of any narcotic drug was constitutional as applied to defendants' who had been
charged with possession and conspiracy to violate the Narcotic Drugs Law.
85. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
86. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App. 553, 556, 558 P.2d 307, 309
(1976).
87. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.
The legislature shall implement this section." ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (1972).
88. Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal
Law. 28 RUTrERS L. REv. 861, 873 (1975).
89. Cornblatt, Sin and The Laws of New Jersey, 14 N.J. ST. B.J. 20, 24 (Fall
1970) (quoting Sills, League of New Jersey Municipalities Magazine 26-27 (April
1969) ).
90. Ingber, supra note 88, at 880.
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towards all such moral crimes, including perhaps, gambling and prosti-
tution, 1 as well as sodomy and homosexual offenses.
The rightful exercise of power over an individual can be justified
only if its objective is to prevent harm to others 2 A system that per-
ceives crime as predominantly a social rather than an individual harm
lacks this limiting factor and inhibits individuals from growing and
developing to their full potential. Acts, then, which are concerned
only with "private morals or ethical sanctions," should not be pun-
ished.03
In a free society, illegal acts should be limited to those which
threaten the peace, safety and/or stability of the society, including
those which so outrage its citizens' sense of justice or propriety that
they may reasonably demand protection from being exposed to them.
A free society should not attempt to impose the notions of sin held
by any one segment of its population upon the entire body politic.94
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Saunders extends the
right of privacy to consensual sexual acts between adults and repre-
sents a step towards "toleration of the maximum individual freedom
... consistent with the integrity of society.
' 95
LAWRENCE M. Ross
91. At common law, gambling had not been an indictable offense "unless it was
tainted with fraud, was accompanied by a breach of the peace, or for other social
reason ran counter to public policy." Carll & Ramagosa, Inc. v. Ash, 23 N.J. 436, 438,
129 A.2d 433, 434 (1957). See also Cornblatt, supra note 89, at 21. Prostitution, in
the absence of definite evils which are proper subjects of regulation, is but a woman,
who in full possession of her faculties, offers her body for indiscriminate sexual activity
for a fee. But, if her solicitation occurs by words or behavior in any public place, then
the solicitation is offensive to public order and will affront public sensibilities or
decency. Furthermore, prostitution is a proper subject of regulation if an individual
procures or lives on another's prostitution, or premises are maintained as a brothel.
Cornblatt, supra note 89, at 22. Barring any of these occurrences, though, as long as
she conducts her activities in private, "[tihere [should be] limits to the degree of dis-
couragement which the criminal law can properly exercise towards a woman who has
deliberately decided to live her life in this way . . . ." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION § 226 (1957) (The Wolfenden Report).
A recent Family Court case in New York, In re P., 92 Misc. 2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455
(1977), seems to have reached a similar conclusion. The court discussed the constitu-
tionality of the New York statute on prostitution, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (Mc-
Kinney 1969), and concluded that the provision was unconstitutional under New
York's right to privacy and equal protection clauses.
92. [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He can not
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear ... because, in the opinion of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 8-9 (1946).
93. See Cornblatt, supra note 89, at 20. See also P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS 16 (1965).
94. Cornblatt, supra note 89, at 20.
95. P. DEVLIN, supra note 93, at 16.
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